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I. ABSTRACT

There has been extensive jurisprudential literature positing that the
structure, values, and processes of the American legal and educational
system, focusing heavily on adversarial battle among parties in court, and
competition in law school, are fundamentally "male-centered." This "malefemale" construct suggests that there is an essential dichotomy between the
two genders with respect to resolving disputes that is reflected in the legal
system, and that this "male-female" dichotomy is harmful to all participants
and perhaps to justice itself.
This article expands upon this literature by arguing that many of the
dysfunctional characteristics of the American legal system labeled "male"
in the traditional feminist critiques are, from a comparative and historical
perspective, not essentially male at all, but simply deviant from the
jurisprudential approach of the great bulk of the world's legal systems, most
of which are also dominated by men.
II. INTRODUCTION
In the last three decades, there has been extensive jurisprudential
literature positing that the structure, values, and processes of the American
legal and educational system, focusing heavily on adversarial battle among
parties in court, and competition in law school, are fundamentally "malecentered."' The "male-centered" adversarial approach to legal education
1.

See, e.g., LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMAN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL AND

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997); Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting

Conversations about Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L & POL'Y
119 (Spring 1997); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND

WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 1993); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of the

Feminizationof the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
289 (Spring 1989); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculation on a Women's
Lawyering Process, I BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 39 (1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux:

Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 75 (Fall 1994); Robin
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and legal process has also been termed the "gladiatorial" approach.2 This
"male-female" construct suggests that there is an essential dichotomy
between the two genders with respect to resolving disputes that is reflected
in the legal system,3 and that this "male-female" dichotomy is harmful to all
participants and perhaps to justice itself.4
West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (Winter 1988); Robin West, Economic Man and
Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. REV. 867, 869 (1988); Yxta Maya Murray, A
Jurisprudenceof Nonviolence, 9 CoNN. PUB. INT. L.J. 65, 77, (2009) (quoting Carrie Menkel Meadow,
Portia in a Diferent Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, I BERKLEY WOMEN's L.J.
39, 45 (1985) "As Carrie Menkel-Meadow explains: 'Where men see danger in too much connection or
intimacy, in being engulfed and losing their own identity, women see danger in the loss of connection,
in not having an identity through caring for others and by being abandoned and isolated."'); Susan D.
Carle, Review Essay, Gender in the Construction of the Lawyer's Persona: Florence Kelley and the
Nation's Work: The Rise of the Women's PoliticalCulture, 1830-1900, 22 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 239
(Spring 1999); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional
Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1175 (1992); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method,
and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (Summer 1983) (arguing that the
"objective standard" is simply the male point of view in disguise. Traditional liberal legalism makes
male dominance invisible and legitimate by adopting the male point of view in law at the same time as it
enforces that view on society.).
2.
See, e.g., Sturm, supranote 1, at 119; Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st
Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 819,847-48 (2008).
To be sure, they do not ask students to play the role of warrior litigators,
but nor do they ask them to play the role of problem-solving
collaborators. In failing to do so, they fail to maximize the chances that
tomorrow's lawyers will act to change the adversarial legal culture in
which they operate.
3.
Murray, supra note 1, at 76 (Women's thinking is "contextual" and "informed by a more
complex understanding of the psychological dynamics of relationships." She distinguishes this feminine
mode of analysis from the masculine, which analyzes moral problems using "abstract[ions]" and "moral
absolutes," a style she characterizes as "math[ematical]" and "hierarchical."); id. at 65 (This article
"celebrates women's 'ethic of care,"' which is a brand of moral reasoning that emphasizes empathy,
particulars, and human relationships, as opposed to men's "standard of justice," which stresses
individualism, abstraction, and autonomy"); Philomila Tsoukala, Gary Becker, Legal Feminism, and the
Costs of Moralizing Care, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 357, 362 (2007) ("many of the feminist
objections to the adequacy or desirability of economics as a tool for capturing family life can be traced
to feminist impulses that tend to entrench the male/female dichotomy in a number of ways.").
See, e.g., Sari Bashi & Maryana Iskander, Why Legal Education is Failing Women, 18
4.
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 389, 391-92 (2006).
As individuals, law school professors treat women differently from men,
and as institutions, law schools cultivate and reward patterns of behavior
that are more likely to be found among men than among women, even
though these behaviors do not necessarily reflect the skills students need
to be good lawyers, judges, and legal academics;
Tracy E. Higgins, Feminism as Liberalism: A Tribute to the Work of Martha Nussbaum, 19 COLUM J.
GENDER & L. 65, 68-69 (2010).
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This article expands upon this literature by arguing that many of the
dysfunctional characteristics of the American legal system labeled "male"
in the traditional feminist critiques are, from a comparative and historical
perspective, not essentially male at all, but simply deviant from the
jurisprudential approach of the great bulk of the world's legal systems.
Needless to say, the vast majority of the world's legal systems are
dominated by men, and presumably incorporate the value characteristics of
those men. Nevertheless, the adversarial approach to resolving disputes is
not the method for resolving disputes adopted by the great majority of the
world's men. Thus, the most that could be said is that the United States
system reflects the approach of men in the United States towards dispute
resolution. Again, however, if the great majority of the rest of the world's
men choose a different manner of dispute resolution than those of United
States men, including those legal systems that derived from the gladiatorial
approach of the early British common law system, then that difference must
be accounted for by something in United States culture, society, and/or
history apart from the essential characteristics of maleness. In fact, this
article would argue that the sources of the American gladiatorial approach

Recognizing that the exercise of individual choice is always constrained
by culture and context, feminists have argued that under conditions of
gender inequality, assumptions about choice and responsibility are not
politically neutral. This critique has at least two distinct but related
strands. The first and earlier strand emphasizes women's position in
various social relationships--women as providers of care. According to
this critique, liberal notions of autonomy posit an unrealistically
unencumbered individual or "atomistic man." Beginning from this
conception of liberal autonomy, some feminists have argued that
liberalism undervalues care and connection and, as a result, is distinctly
masculine in its orientation.
Chiwen Bao et al., Left Learning: Theory and Practice in Teaching from the Left in Law School, 31
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 479,487 (2007).
Today's legal environment demands different skills: negotiation,
managing multiple sources of information, and role flexibility are
important skills for lawyers. Some skills modem lawyers must possess,
such as collaboration with clients and colleagues, correspond to those
that feminists ascribe to women more generally; the failure to teach law
as to improve those skills, however, may signal that what is learned in
law school and what legal practice actually entails may be largely
unrelated.
NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS & MORAL EDUCATION (1984); Stephen

Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665 (1993); Martha Minow, The
Supreme Court 1986 Term Foreword, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 43, n.155 (1987).
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to dispute resolution can be witnessed not just in law, but in the American
economic, social, and political system.
For example, all common-law countries share the common history of
the British legal system, which incorporated "trial by battle" from its
earliest genesis and still relies on an adversarial conflict between the
participants. Nevertheless, the jurisprudential approach in the United States
is somewhat unique in that it reflects an exaggerated free-market,
"gladiatorial" approach to resolving a wide variety of legal and non-legal
disputes. Thus, the gladiatorial, or "trial by battle" approach to resolving
disputes can be witnessed in the unique United States legal approach to
resolving labor disputes, delineating the limits of free speech, as well as, in
the more quintessentially legal procedural issues of determining guilt and
innocence in a criminal trial or economic liability in a civil trial. Indeed,
many legal commentators defend the adversarial system precisely because
it reflects the competition that is encouraged in other sectors of American
society.
This article is principally concerned with the dysfunctionality of the
"gladiator" approach in American law, which is primarily a procedural, or
process-oriented, concern. This focus on the process by which substantive
rules are created should be distinguished from the substantive rules
themselves. Thus, a critique of the dysfunctionality of those substantive
rules or laws, or the means by which substantive rules in the United States
and other countries perpetuate patriarchy, is beyond the scope of this
article.'
5.
6.

See Kutak, infra note 6, at 174, and accompanying text.
See Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in DAVID LUBAN,

THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 172, 174 (1983), in which the author

argues that the adversarial system is culturally appropriate for Americans because of their
predominantly competitive society. The adversarial system reflects "the same deep- seated values we
place on competition among economic suppliers, political parties, and moral and political ideals. It is an
individualistic system of judicial process for an individualistic society." See also Anatol Rapaport,
Theories of Conflict Resolution and Law, in M.L. FRIEDMAN, COURTS AND TRIALS:
A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 22, 29 (1975), in which the author argues that the U.S. adversarial
system reflects the emphasis on competition in our society, and is a "direct transplant of competitive
economics into the apparatus ofjustice."
7.
This author assumes as proven that the great majority of the world's legal systems contain
substantive rules that reflect male dominance. Indeed, a woman lawyer may, as a gross generalization,
be arguably more caring and less adversarial oriented in her approach to procedure and yet still share
very traditional assumptions about gender roles that would lead her to support substantive legal rules
that disproportionately harm women and/or or men or enforce gender stereotyping. This article
therefore also assumes as proven the enormous legal literature demonstrating that our legal system has
adopted, as a substantive matter, legal norms enforcing male dominance through de jure sexual
stereotyping. Based upon these assumptions, it would therefore be difficult to argue that this substantive
institutionalization of male hegemony is not "essentially" gendered, particularly since, unlike the

198

ILSA JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 18:1

This article accepts that the legal system in the United States does
reflect "male" values, at least asfar as male values are socially constructed

in the United States. This article also accepts the assumption that many
men throughout the world have historically chosen to resolve disputes
through violence, and that, as a gross generalization, this mode of dispute
resolution may be more typical of males than females. This article merely
argues that the vast majority of the world's societies, historically and
contemporaneously, have chosen to resolve disputes outside of war or
armed struggle through means which are much less aggressive and conflictdriven as that exhibited by the United States (and to some extent the
British) system of justice. This article will first discuss the contemporary
feminist critique of the United States legal system. It will then expand upon
this critique, arguing that the dysfunctions identified by the feminist
critique are not essentially male at all, but simply unique to the particular
history of Anglo-Saxon legal culture, and particularly that of the United
States. The particular approach of the United States towards dispute
resolution is reflected in the free-market, "gladiatorial" or adversarial
approach to resolving a wide variety of political, economic, social, and
legal disputes,' which frequently differs even from other common law
systems. This article will then explore the unique history of the AngloAmerican legal system that could explain at least some of its significant
deviation from the rest of the world's legal systems. Lastly, the article will
discuss how many male-dominated, non-common law systems do not share
many of those dysfunctional characteristics labeled "male" in United States
society. This article will then explore forms of dispute resolution adopted
by other societies. This article will then conclude with a discussion of the
implications of this argument for reforming the United States legal system
through reforming the manner in which law is created and applied.
III. EXPANDING THE CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE UNITED
STATES LEGAL SYSTEM

There has been an enormous amount of literature written on the
particular ways in which the United States legal system reflects particularly
male values in the manner in which it trains lawyers and the ways in which
the legal system resolves disputes.' Much of this literature has posited that
procedural differences between the US legal system and the rest of the world's legal systems, this male
dominance of substantive legal rules is global, and historically consistent.
8.
See generally Paul T. Wangerin, The PoliticalAnd Economic Roots of The "Adversary
System" ofJustice And "Alternative DisputeResolution," 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 203 (1994).
9.
See generally Sturm, supra note 1; See also Rand Jack & Dana Crowley Jack, Women
Lawyers: Achetype and Alternatives, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 933 (1989).
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this particularly "male" approach to training lawyers and resolving disputes
is problematic for the legal system in generalo and for the achievement of
the legal system's primary goal of justice."
Feminist critiques of the adversary system incorporate numerous
elements. The two most salient are a general critique of the adversary
system in terms of its negative consequences for achieving justice, and a
specifically gender based critique, focusing on the negative consequences
for the individuals engaged in the process, and on the system's
promulgation of the "male" values of aggression and atomistic
individualism.

10.
Nancy A. Welsh, Looking Down the Road Less Traveled: Challenges to Persuadingthe
Legal Profession to Define Problems More Humanistically,2008 J. DisP. RESOL. 45,57-58 (2008).
I do know, however, that other professional schools are incorporating the
development of "emotional intelligence" into their curricula, researchers
are exploring the revision of law school *58 admissions practices to
include consideration of humanistic factors that predict effective
lawyers, and the Camegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching
has highlighted the law schools that are trying to assist law students in
connecting legal conclusions "with the rich complexity of actual
situations that involve full-dimensional people."
Anita Bernstein, Pitfalls Ahead: A Manifesto for the Training of Lawyers, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 479,
517 (2009).
A pitfalls pedagogy gives law students the vantage point from which to
see any topic of professional responsibility both as a quick prod for a
lawyer and in all its depth. By talking about problems for lawyers as
sources of strategy and strength, and commending vigor in response to a
setback, the pedagogy combats a tendency toward anxiety and
unhappiness that wafts through law schools.
Id. at 481 (2009).
This morose assessment, spoken from a locus of relative comfort and
ease, appears to be shared at varying levels of privilege within the
profession. Whether they choose to address demoralization, depression,
dissatisfaction at work and in school, alienation, cynicism, heartlessness,
or another pathology that lawyers and law students manifest,
commentators on this population are united in their gloom. The
empirically inclined among them gather data about lawyers' unhappiness
that suggest an intractable problem.
11.
See, e.g., Susain Daicoff, Articles Lawyer, Know Thyself A Review of Empirical
Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337 (1997) ("In the
last ten to fifteen years, three related crises have emerged with respect to the legal profession:
'professionalism' has declined, public opinion of attorneys and the legal profession has plummeted, and
lawyer dissatisfaction and dysfunction have increased. . . ."). See also Sturm, supra note 1, at 119
("Dissatisfaction permeates the public and professional discourse about lawyers and legal
education ..... ").
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Regarding the first element of this critique, the negative effects of the
adversary system on justice and society as a whole have been widely
discussed in the legal literature, and include such concerns as:
a) Its non-contextual focus, based on winning with an
abstract set of rules rather than achieving a mediated
approach with a result more beneficial for both parties; 12
b) Its tendency to reward the wealthiest members of
society, since they can afford the best lawyers or
"gladiators," and are more likely to win, even if
"objective" criteria of "justice"" would dictate a different
outcome;
c) A focus not just on the economically dominant actors
in society and third parties, but also a disregard for the
non-dominant economic actors to the dispute itself, as
epitomized by the "economic" approach to calculating
contracts and torts damages, rather than actual damages;14
d) Its focus on the short-term economic interests of those
in power, rather than the longer-term interests on third
parties and the community in general;"

Jack, supra note 9, at 934 ("An attitude of emotional detachment reinforces the idea that
12.
law is a game to be played for its own sake; the adversary nature of law makes it easy to maintain
personal distance ... ). "Women entering the practice of law find that the mores of the game bear the
imprint of boys' play rather than that of girls." Id. at 935. See also West, supra note 1, at 1 (There are,
of course, other dysfunctional aspects of the adversary system on justice and other nocent consequences
of the system on individuals and society of this particular approach. Robin West has been one of the
leading advocates of such a position, arguing a "Separation Thesis," which posits that the maledominated dominant culture has forced us to think of ourselves and the world as separate. Males thus
think of themselves as definitionally separate from other human beings. West asserts that women are
"connected;" they differ fundamentally from men in that their basic experience is of connection
(because of pregnancy and breast-feeding and because women are penetrated, rather than penetrating, in
sexual intercourse) rather than of individuality. Women are more likely to view the morality of actions
against a standard of responsibility to others, rather than against a standard of rights and autonomy from
others. Males are therefore more likely to be more aggressive in litigation and negotiation, and in the
manner they construct the legal system itself. Thus, women are more likely to be contextualist in their
interpretation of the law, while men are more likely to apply abstract legal principles to issues,
disregarding the human connections involved.).
The author apologizes for the use of quotations, as it tends to resemble a well-known
13.
Saturday Night Live skit, but it is arguable whether objective concepts of justice can actually be
absolutely ascertained. Nevertheless, such terms are used in a relativist sense.
14. See, e.g., Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Min. Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), in which
the interests of the plaintiffs in seeing their property restored to its original state, pursuant to their
contract with the mining company (specific performance), was sacrificed to the economic interests of
the mining company in paying only market-level damages for its destruction of the property, which were
minimal. See also economic approach to calculation of torts and contract damages.
15.
Sturm, supranote 1, at 119.
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e) Its marginalization of women, people of color and
sexual minorities;' 6
f) Legal education's preoccupation with analysis rather
than the "multi-faceted, transactional nature of legal
practice[;]"l 7
g) Whether law schools adequately train lawyers to deal
effectively with 21' Century challenges, and whether the
models of legal professionalism advanced by those
schools are "morally and ethically justifiable;"' 8 and
finally;
h) A disregard for non-adversarial means of dispute
resolution,19 reflecting the preferred (and unique) United
States conflict-based or "market" approach to resolving
disputes.
The second element of the gender-based critique focuses more on the
gender-specific aspects of the adversarial system, arguing that the
dysfunctional aspects contained in the first element of the critique results
from the essentially male characteristics of the system and the system's
actors. Heather Elliott, in a critique of the "difference model" of feminist
theory, describes that model as follows:

Id.; Hon. Deanell Reece Tacha, Women and Law: Challenging What is Natural and
16.
Proper,31 NOVA L. REV. 259, 272 (2007) ("Women in the judiciary have certainly had a positive effect
on society in general and the legal profession specifically. For example, their presence has encouraged
young women to pursue legal careers, and they have raised awareness of gender bias in the court
system.").
17.
18.

Sturm, supranote 1, at 119.
Id.

19. Andrea Macerollo, The Power of Masculinity in the Legal Profession: Women Lawyers
and Identity Formation,25 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 121, 125-26 (2008).
The current state of the adversarial system exerts a disproportionate
influence over lawyers' ethics and challenges the contemporary use of
alternative dispute resolution and collaborative approaches to problemsolving. This thereby undermines practice styles which may be valuable
for women in order to explore new means to validate their professional
identities. Thornton found in her interviews of female lawyers that
women become more affected by the ethical dilemmas posed by private
practice's obsession with profits and the devaluation of family and
personal life. These ongoing trends in the legal profession continue to
undermine equality goals and render gender issues invisible, which
unduly complicate women lawyers' identity formation.
Id. at 138 ("The 'double bind' means that women lawyers must achieve a delicate balance between the
expression of masculine qualities and the repression of feminine qualities, with only subtle exposure of
characteristics emanating from either side of the gender dichotomy.").
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Many scholars posit that an essentially female point of
view affects the decision making of female judges.
Women are thought to "contribut[e] a new, and perhaps
uniquely female, perspective to lawyering-a more
collaborative, cooperative and contextual approach with a
preference for non- adversarial modes of dispute
resolution over binary, rights-based justice." 20
The argument is that many of those dysfunctional characteristics of the
system can be remedied by incorporating arguably, essentially, "female"
values of mediation and cooperation. The vast majority of the literature
would argue that the stereotypical male characteristics of the legal
profession are not simply a function of the dominance of men in the
profession, but rather the institutional embrace and reproduction of those
male values, regardless of the gender of the person participating in the
system. Indeed, much of the contemporary literature addressing this issue
has posited that admitting women into the legal profession has only a
limited impact on the profession and legal education since women learn to
change themselves to conform to the "male" profession.2 1
For example, it could be argued that the positive law approach in civil
law, applying a rather broad general rule to each factual case on a de novo
basis, 22 permits civil law courts to take context into account in applying
law. This stands in opposition to the common law approach of forcing
individuals into rigid legal rules, most of which were created with men in
mind.23 As noted above, this article would argue that the contemporary

20.
Heather Elliott, The Diference Women Judges Make: Stare Decisis, Norms of
Collegiality, and "Feminine Jurisprudence:" A Research Proposal, 16 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 41, 41
(2001) (quoting Cynthia Grant Bowman, BibliographicalEssay: Women and the Legal Profession, 7
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 149, 172 (1999)).
21.

See Jack, supranote 9, at 935.
Given that qualities learned by women at home and in play make them
vulnerable in a predominantly male profession, one solution women
have attempted is to eradicate feminine characteristics. . . . Particularly
in the legal profession, which prides itself on objectivity,
professionalism, and combativeness, traditional feminine traits are
unacceptable.

22.
This author acknowledges that while many civil law countries do not technically employ
stare decisis, in reality, they may frequently employ something akin to stare decisis by employing case
precedent as very persuasive case authority. As we know in the common law system, a skillful advocate
can frequently turn persuasive authority into binding authority and vice versa.
23.
The author also recognizes that theoretically, the civil law attempts to limit judicial
discretion rather than permit it, as the preceding sentence seems to suggest. Nevertheless, in practice,
the civil law system arguably permits more judicial discretion in responding to the particular context of
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feminist critique of the United States legal system is too limited in its
overly narrow focus on only gender-based sexual explanations for these
dysfunctions in the United States legal system. This article would itself
posit at least seven ways in which the traditional feminist critique is overly
narrow.
First, characterizing the debate over the future of our legal system as a
debate over essentially male and female values gives our present legal
system too much credit. There are aspects of the United States legal system
that are not essentially male at all, but simply dysfunctional. As long as the
debate over the nature of the American legal system is characterized by an
essentially "male-female" dichotomy, there implies a certain equality
between the dual perspectives on our legal system. It implicitly also
suggests that one variant is appropriate for a male and one for a female.
This article would argue that what is characterized as "female" in the
present literature may simply be a less dysfunctional legal approach to
resolving disputes. The corollary to this argument is that what is
characterized as "male" in the present literature may not constitute an
appropriate approach to dispute resolution for either gender. In support of
this argument, this article will demonstrate that the vast majority of the
world's legal systems, historically and contemporaneously, have come to a
similar conclusion, even though those systems have been overwhelmingly
dominated by men. This article would thus take issue with those legal
commentators such as Linda Chavez, who would argue that women should
stop whining and "get with the program." 2 4 Those legal commentators
assume, in an ethnocentric, sexist, and simplistic fashion, that the present
United States legal system is the appropriate yardstick by which to evaluate
the functionality of legal systems in general.
Second, the debate over what is male or female risks not only focusing
on gender rather than the dysfunction itself, but also risks stereotyping
women into an essentialist straightjacket. Indeed, empirical research
undertaken by at least one legal commentator has indicated that the United
States legal profession attracts both men and women who have a preexisting tendency to engage in the more unsavory gladiatorial aspects of
legal combat than the population at large.25 Those women who may be
a case, the incorporation of which is one of the hallmarks of a feminist approach to the law, according to
some legal commentators.
24. Linda Chavez, Would-be Women Lawyers Need to Quit Lookingfor Excuses andGet with
the Program,CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 1997, at 23, availableat http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-0416/news/9704160002__1lani-guinier-law-students-top-law-firms (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
25. See, e.g., Daicoff, supranote 11, at n.5, and accompanying text.
Attorneys appear to differ from the general population in the way that
they approach problems and make decisions, what they value and
respond to, and what motivates them. Some of their personality and
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attracted to the legal profession because they exhibit some of the
traditionally defined male characteristics are no less essentially "female"
than women with more traditionally defined female characteristics. Thus, it
may not be men themselves that are the problem, but rather those
aggressive characteristics we traditionally associate with men, which are
26
present in both men and women, albeit to arguably different degrees.
It is also possible to argue that we cannot even ascertain what women
essentially are since they are the social constructs of a male dominated
society. As Catharine MacKinnon argues:
Women have a history all right, but it is a history both of
what was and of what was not allowed to be. So I am
critical of affirming what we have been, which necessarily
is what we have been permitted, as if it is women's, ours,
possessive. As if equality, in spite of everything, already
ineluctably exists. 27
From a different perspective, Justice O'Connor categorically rejects
the "difference model" and articulates the viewpoint shared by many people
that essentialism can prejudice women who choose to participate in the
legal system as presently structured. Her insight is helpful in understanding
this position, although this author would argue that her position too facilely
dismisses the difference model, and too easily accepts, as a normative
matter, the present structure of the legal system:
[Tihe move to ask again the question whether women are
different merely by virtue of being women recalls the old
myths we have struggled to put behind us. Undaunted by
the historical resonances, however, more and more writers
have suggested that women practice law differently than
men. One author has even concluded that my opinions
differ in a peculiarly feminine way from those of my
colleagues.... The gender differences currently cited are
surprisingly similar to stereotypes from years past.
Women attorneys are more likely to seek to mediate
disputes than litigate them. Women attorneys are more
likely to focus on resolving a client's problem than on
vindicating a position. Women attorneys are more likely
cognitive characteristics appear to be present prior to law school, and
some appear to be amplified by or inculcated in law school.
26. Id. at n.183-188, and accompanying text. This author makes no suggestion as to whether
there is any empirical validity to postulations of differences in "aggression" between men and women.
27.

(1987).

CATHERINE MACKINNoN, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:

DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 39
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to sacrifice career advancement for family obligations.
Women attorneys are more concerned with public service
or fostering community than with individual achievement.
Women judges are more likely to emphasize context and
de-emphasize general principles. Women judges are more
compassionate. And so forth.
This "New Feminism" is interesting, but troubling, precisely because it
so nearly echoes the Victorian myth of the "True Woman" that kept women
out of law for so long. It is a little chilling to compare these suggestions to
Clarence Darrow's assertion that women are too kind and warm-hearted to
be shining lights at the bar.2 8 From a somewhat different viewpoint, human
rights legal commentator Ratna Kapur argues that the essentialization of
women as victims is counterproductive in the international human rights
context. She writes that:
My main argument is that the focus on the victim subject
in the [violence against women] campaign reinforces
gender and cultural essentialism in the international
women's human rights arena. It also buttresses claims of
some "feminist" positions in India that do not produce an
emancipatory politics for women. This focus fails to take
advantage of the liberating potential of important feminist
insights.
These insights have challenged the
public/private distinction along which human rights has

28.
Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia'sProgress,66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1546, 1553 (1991). But that
is not, of course, the same as arguing that qualities that are traditionally associated with women are not
valuable in the judicial context. It's just that they don't have to be characterized as solely female
qualities. Cf Arrie W. Davis, The Richness of Experience, Empathy, and the Role of a Judge: The
Senate Confirmation hearingsfor Judge Sonia Sotomayor,40 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 17 (2009).
In the context of judicial decision-making, empathy, which, at its core,
involves the ability to understand the life experiences or emotions of
another person, need not mean "intuition" nor should it be perceived as
injecting the "mystical" into the ordered resolution of disputes. Rather,
as Professor Lynne Henderson explains, "empathy enables the decision
maker to have an appreciation of the human meanings of a given legal
situation," ultimately aiding the judge both in the process of reaching a
legal conclusion and in justifying that conclusion "in a way that
disembodied reason simply cannot." Moreover, the fact that a judge has
the ability to empathize with human beings involved in a legal dispute
does not mean that the judge is, thus, unable to decide the case in a fair
and impartial manner.
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operated, and traditional understandings of power as
emanating exclusively from a sovereign state.29
Even assuming the validity of the "difference model" assumptions
posited by some feminist theorists, there can be little doubt that there is a
tremendous amount of overlap between men and women with respect to
these sex differences.30
Third, traditionally "male" values of aggression in conflict resolution
are so institutionally imbedded in our legal system that women frequently
find themselves forced to adapt to that traditionally male model, and thus,
29.
Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrectingthe "Native" Subject
in International/Post-ColonialFeminist Legal Politics, 15 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 1, 2 (2002). See also
Darren Rosenblum, Rethinking InternationalWomen's Human Rights Through Eve Sedgwick, 33 HARV.
J. L. & GENDER 349, 353-54 (2010).
Positing that women are sexualized victims relies on the currency of
MacKinnon-style essentialist notions of both sex and culture in the
International Women's Human Rights arena. IWHR's emphasis on the
victim subject overlooks multi-layered experiences that take into account
perspectives of class, race, religion, ethnicity, and/or sexual orientation.
This posture marginalizes and disempowers women in the developing
world. These women victim subjects need states to protect them,
opening the door to their moral regulation. This moral regulation can
serve to imprison women in a second wave sexual paradigm. In this
recreated attic reverberating with yellow wallpaper, it is not men's
perception of women's hysteria that traps them, but women's own
obsession with victimhood.
See also Jonathan Todres, Law, Otherness, and Human Trafficking, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 605, 611
(2009) ("1 argue, however, that the issue of the victim-subject narrative in the dominant discourse on
human trafficking is one aspect of a larger problem-the operation of otherness in the conception of the
problem of human trafficking and, consequently, the legal strategies developed to combat it."). See also
id. at 609.
Othering operates across multiple dimensions, including race, gender,
ethnicity, class, caste, culture, and geography.
The result is a
devaluation of certain individuals, communities, and even nations, and a
privileging of those who are members of the dominant group, class, or
country. Some populations experience "intersectional othering" because
they possess multiple characteristics that are devalued in the current
global power structure.
For example, poor women of color in
developing countries confront othering across potentially all of the above
mentioned dimensions, giving them little or no voice in shaping the
dominant understanding of human trafficking or appropriate remedies to
the problem.
30.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 410-11 (1990) ("The

male and female distributions of attributes intersect. Many women are more aggressive and less
nurturant than many men, just as many women are taller than many men, although the average man is
taller than the average woman.").

2011]

Wilets

207

women themselves become perpetrators of that system that was, in fact,
created by men. Thus, focusing solely on the sex of the perpetrator of
"male" values ignores that many of the perpetrators are women, albeit
women who have been "co-opted" by a "male" system.
Fourth, as a corollary to the argument immediately above, restricting
the debate over reforming the United States' judicial system to a "malefemale" debate risks generalizing American concepts of "male" as
universally male. As this article will argue, many of the dysfunctional
characteristics of the United States legal, political, and economic system
labeled male, are not shared by most other legal systems that are as male
dominated as the United States system. Thus, the traditional feminist
critiques of the United States legal system risk perpetuating the myth that
the structure and functioning of United States society is indicative of what
the rest of the world is, does, or should do.
Fifth, although the purpose of this article is to suggest a conceptual
framework for thinking about our legal system that transcends a rigidly
dualist social constructed male-female paradigm, it should be recognized
that the dysfunctional consequences of those aspects of the United States
legal system that are labeled "male" may, in fact, be experienced by
individuals as very gender-specific.3 1 In this sense, the essentialist-social
constructionist debate may appear largely irrelevant to those experiencing
the harmful consequences of male hegemony in their daily lives. Those
consequences are, after all, certainly gender based to the extent gender is
always socially constructed within a particular society. Nevertheless, it is
important to look beyond the United States social construction of gender in
order to explore and advance the best means of reforming the legal system
without limiting ourselves to the United States experience.
Sixth, from a practical perspective, characterizing the dysfunctional
aspects of the United States legal system as essentially "male," encourages
the male members of the legal profession to be more resistant to reforming
the dysfunctional characteristics of the United States legal system than they
might otherwise be.32 After all, the negative consequences of these
31.

See, e.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION

120 (1991).

("Sexual

difference as gender inequality no less 'real' for being socially constructed.").
32. See generally Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of
Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1038 (1996) ("Feminist legal theorists have paid mild attention to
whether men could embrace feminist objectives. . .. This issue is treated as a relatively unimportant
one, usually relegated to footnotes."). See also Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal
Theory, 23 Wis. J.L. GENDER & Soc'Y 201, 204 (2008).
Men are the dominant casualties and injuries in war. Systemically, men
are the dominant victims of violent crime. Men often pay a price for
their privilege, a price that many may be unwilling to pay but are
blocked from another alternative. In addition, how the price of privilege
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dysfunctional aspects of the United States legal system can negatively
affect both male and female members of the legal profession and society.3 3
As Nancy Levit argues, the traditional discourse between cultural feminists
and dominance theorists on the one hand, and men on the other, leads to
dialogue as a competition. "The form of the argument-that women's
ethics should prevail over men's-sets up a discourse that is at best
competitive, at worst combative. Whose values should prevail?" 34 In this
battle, unfortunately, society cannot win, particularly when men currently
dominate the political, legal, and economic spheres of American society.
This article does not suggest that the comparative critique proffered
herein boils down to a simple argument for alternative dispute resolution as
the solution for the gladiatorial aspects of the United States legal system.
Many leading scholars have proffered just such an alternative as a solution
to the problems with the adversarial system," and some legal commentators
have suggested that "alternative dispute resolution" (ADR) constitutes, to
some extent, the feminist alternative to the "male" adversarial system.
Nevertheless, this article limits its scope to suggesting that because many
societies have already incorporated ADR techniques as part of their legal
procedure, the ADR present in those societies simply evidences that a nonadversarial approach to dispute resolution is more likely to be determined

can be exacted, even when privilege itself may not be enjoyed, exposes
the complex way in which gender hierarchy is sustained.
Id. at 204.
Powerlessness of the individual has to be taken into account but does not
remove the reality of power-and maybe advantage or privilege-for the
group as a whole. Institutions, structures, and practices that reinforce
such arbitrary gender power must be our focus, including where they
subordinate and injure boys and men.
33.

See Levit, supra note 32, at 1040, in which the author observes:
The image of masculinity is also formed by legal responses to areas in
which men suffer injuries. Laws preventing male plaintiffs from suing
for same-sex sexual harassment, and analysts' lack of interest in male
rape and spousal battery of men contribute to a climate in which men are
taught to suffer in silence. In the areas of parental leave and child
custody, men are socially and legally excluded from caring and nurturing
roles. Various legal doctrines send distinct messages about what it
means to be male. This cumulative legal ideology of masculinity is
under-explored.

34. Id. at 1047.
35.
See Landsman, infra note 42, and accompanying text (Justice Burger's condemnation of
adversarial litigation and endorsement of ADR as a solution to those problems with litigation).
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by culture than determined by essentialist concepts of gender." Moreover,
ADR may frequently and simply reproduce adversarial values in a new
form." ADR may also perpetuate and expand the uniquely aggressive
American concept of "freedom of contract," which arguably is one more
way of introducing adversarial, gladiatorial values into the structure of
social relations.
IV. A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW APPROACH TO DISPUTE
RESOLUTION

A. "Trial by Battle" in Litigation
It would be helpful to examine the history of that
adversarial/gladiatorial approach to understand how this adversarial
approach to dispute resolution has been a unique component of common
law dispute resolution for over a millennium.
1. A Very Short History of the Common Law
It is easier to understand the unique legal experience of common law
countries when one understands the unusual development of dispute
resolution in England. "Litigation" in medieval England was frequently
characterized by, inter alia, a literal battle between the parties,
appropriately termed "trial by battle," or, somewhat later, through a kind of
metaphorical battle between the defendant and God, exemplified by "trial
by ordeal" involving such specific litigation techniques as "trial by fire"
and "ordeal of cold water."38
36.
See Julie Barker, A Better Alternative for the Resolution of Commercial Disputes:
Guidelinesfor a U.S. NegotiatorInvolved in an InternationalCommercial Mediation with Mexicans, 19
LOYOLA INT'L & COMP. L.J. (1996).
37.
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a PostModern, Multi-Cultural World, I J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETH. 49,72 (1996).
I strongly believe that we are on the right track in experimenting with
and using a variety of forms of "alternative dispute resolution" - I prefer
the new term - "appropriate dispute resolution." Yet, as I have stated
elsewhere, I fear many of these forms (mediation, mini-trials, settlement
conferences, early neutral evaluations, reg-neg) are becoming corrupted
by the persistence of adversarial values.
38. See, e.g., Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant's Strugglefor Access to Justice: Meeting
the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 39 (2002) (Civil and criminal
disputes in medieval England were decided by primitive trials by battle, wagers of law, and trial by
ordeal). See also STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND A DEFENSE 8-

9 (1984); and Henry Lea, The Wager of Battle, in LAW AND WARFARE: STUDIES IN THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONFLICT 233-53 (Paul Bohannan ed., 1967). For an outstanding statistical
analysis and description of medieval English forms of adjudication and their prevalence, see Daniel
Klerman, Settlement And The Decline Of PrivateProsecution In Thirteenth-CenturyEngland, 19 LAW
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Legal historian Theodore F.T. Plucknett gives a description of trial by
battle in the context of criminal litigation, observing that battle occurred in
criminal cases, "[w]hen a private person brought a criminal charge against
another. It was deadly; if the defeated defendant was not already slain in
the battle he was immediately hanged on the gallows which stood ready."3 9
Legal historian J.H. Baker discusses some of the other adjudication
techniques in criminal cases, where the litigation more closely resembled
contemporary litigation to the extent society as a whole-or fire, water,
etc.- functioned as the arbiter of justice:
Ordeals involved an appeal to God to reveal the truth in
human disputes.

. .

. In [ordeal by fire], a piece of iron

was put into a fire and then in the party's hand; the hand
was bound, and inspected a few days later; if the bum had
festered, God was taken to have decided against the party.
The ordeal of cold water required the party to be trussed
and lowered into a pond; if he sank, the water was deemed
to have "received him" with God's blessing, and so he
was quickly fished out.40
English legal historian F.M. Powicke noted the explicit
interrelationship between law and force throughout common law legal
history:
Law in a feudal society was inseparable from force, but
not obscured by it: they were informed by the theory of
contract which informed all feudal relations.

. .

. Force

was never absent, yet was never uncontrolled. In civil
procedure we find the elements of war, such as the duel,
and the hue and cry; and in war, we find constant
applications of legal theory. War was a great lawsuit.
The truce was very like an essoin, a treaty drawn up on
the lines of a final concord, the hostage a surety, service in
the field was the counterpart of suit of court. The
closeness of the analogy between the field of battle and
the law court is seen in judicial combat. Trial by battle

& HIST. REv. 1 (2001); CHRISTOPHER BROOKE, FROM ALFRED TO HENRY III, 871-1272 (1961);
GEORGE HOLMES, THE LATER MIDDLE AGES, 1272-1485 (1962).
39.

THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 105 (1929).

40.

J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 5 (3d ed., 1990).
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was a possible incident in all negotiations.41 (Emphasis
added).
Some have taken a different viewpoint, arguing that the adversarial
system is a relatively new concept, conceptually quite distinct from such
systems as "trial-by-battle." 42 A problem with this argument is that it
focuses on the modem technical aspects of the adversary system, which
certainly did arise later, largely to offset the problematic consequences of
the previously existing system. Nevertheless, the adversarial system is
fundamentally analogous to the original "trial by battle," even if the
mechanisms have changed. Indeed, Chief Justice Warren Burger noted the
similarities between the two, and the similarly destructive impact of both
means of trial: "For many claims, trial by adversarial contest must, in time,
go the way of the ancient trial by battle and blood. Our litigation system is
too costly, too painful, too destructive for a truly civilized people."A3
B. DisputeResolution in other Male DominatedSocieties
1. The Common Law versus the Civil Law
Since this article is an effort at illustrating the implications of the
peculiar Anglo-Saxon approach to the legal system, it is useful to think how
an adversarial process is central to the common law's approach to creating
law, as well as its procedural application of law. This is particularly
appropriate since the creation and application of law are dialectical:
although the creation of law such as statutes and constitutions is an entirely
political process, the interpretation and application of that positive law by
judges itself creates new law. This dialectic is particularly pronounced in
the common law, which itself is sometimes defined as "judge made" law.
The intrinsic interrelationship between the creation and application of law
thus makes an analysis of the peculiar mode of law creation in the common
law countries of particular interest for the purposes of this article.
At the same time that the English were attempting to adjudicate by
beating each other to death, or drowning each other, in an effort to

41.
MATTHEW STRICKLAND, WAR AND CHIVALRY: THE CONDUCT AND PERCEPTION OF WAR
IN ENGLAND AND NORMANDY, 1066-1217, at 45 (1996) (citing F.M. PowicKE, THE LOSS OF
NORMANDY, 1189-1204, at 242 (2d rev. ed., 1961)).
42.
See, e.g., Wangerin, supra note 8, at 206-08. See also STEPHEN LANDSMAN, THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984); ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 696-

703 (1959); Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System and the Changing Role of the
Advocate in That System, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 25 (1981).

43.
Barbara Dawson & Michele L. Stevenson, Getting Help with ADR: A Guide to the Main
Players, 10 BUs. L. TODAY 51, 54 (Jan.-Feb. 2001).
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determine God's will," other civilizations, even at this early date, were
creating more rational means of creating law. 45 This is not to say that the
barbaric forms of trial and legal procedure employed by the medieval
British were unique to the British. Nevertheless, at a much earlier date,
other European societies employed more rational, logical means of creating
law and, to a much lesser extent, resolving disputes.4 6 Of course, "rational"
does not always mean "good," as evidenced by the variant of the civil law
used during the Inquisition. Indeed, the common term for the Continental
European approach to judicial dispute resolution is frequently termed the
"Inquisitorial System," which does not readily conjure images of impartial
justice.
The development of a more "rational" or "civilized" approach to law
was more pronounced in the more Romanized areas of the former Roman
Empire, and weaker in the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon areas of Europe.47
For example, in the context of bankruptcy, one legal commentator has
noted that:
44.

See, e.g., PAUL R. HYAMS, "TRIAL BY ORDEAL: THE KEY TO PROOF IN THE EARLY

COMMON LAW," ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 90-126 (1981).

45.
To avoid oversimplification, it is important to note that English theories and philosophy of
law shared a great deal with their continental counterparts, even though the actual procedure of dispute
resolution may have differed substantially. See Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical
Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651, 1656-57 (1994).
It is conventional wisdom that distinctively English conceptions of the
nature, sources, and purposes of law can be traced back to the early
history of the English common law in the twelfth to fifteenth centuries.
In fact, however, there is little in the legal literature of those centuries
that distinguishes English philosophy from that of other peoples of
Western Christendom.
46. See, e.g., Remigius N. Nwabueze, Historicaland Comparative Contextsfor the Evolution
of Conflict ofLaws in Nigeria, 8 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 31 (2001) ("It was in the Italian citystates in the Middle Ages that a scientific approach was adopted toward the solution of disputes arising
from transactions and intercourse with foreigners. They had separate courts, laws and magistrates for
that purpose."). See also KENNETH PENNINGTON, "Law, Procedure of, 1000-1500," Dictionary of the
Middle Ages, 7 (1986) at 502-06; Evan R. Seamone, When Wishing on a Star Just Won't Do: The
Legal Basis for International Cooperation in the Mitigation of Asteroid Impacts and Similar
Transboundary Disasters, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1139 n.167 (2002), and accompanying text (citing
RONALD W. CARSTENS, THE MEDIEVAL ANTECEDENTS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 55 (1992)) (in turn,
crediting John of Paris (1250/4-1304) for articulating the ideal of "stewardship as an authorization to
use or to distribute goods," and the idea that "the community determines jurisdiction over the use of
common things"). RONALD W. CARSTENS, THE MEDIEVAL ANTECEDENTS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 81

(1992) (citing Marsilio of Padua (1275/80-1342), based on the Aristotelian notion that "[tihe utility of
government is measured by the degree to which it can provide the conditions necessary for a 'sufficient
life."').
47.
See generally Katherine Fischer Drew, Public vs. Private Enforcement of the Law in the
Early Middle Ages: Fifth to Twelfth Centuries, 70 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1583, 1587 (1995).
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[T]he innovation of discharge seems much more ordinary
if the comparison is not with a brutal system such as the
medieval English one, which was not even rivaled by the
German one in this count, but with other legal systems
which also had greater experience with commerce. The
cessio bonorum of later Roman Law was followed by
Italian city-states of commercial success such as Padua or
Venice. Cessio bonorum did retreat with the adoption of
the civil codes that substituted Roman law in continental
Europe, but it was not replaced by anything like the
English debtors' prison.4 8
Much of the historical reason for this divergent development resides in
the particularly historically focused development of the civil law, based in
the longstanding Roman and even earlier legal jurisprudential traditions.
To simplify matters, the civil law created law through the conscious,
rational application of human thought to systematically create rules for
human conduct. The civil law, first of all, approaches law as a logical,
deliberate, formulation of rules to cover every potential factual
circumstance that may arrive. An analogy can be made to a hotel reception
area with its set of cubbyholes in which keys and mail are placed. The law
is structured as a set of cubbyholes of legal rules, into which every factual
exigency can be placed.
Richard B. Cappalli, a comparative legal scholar who is a critic of the
civil law system, nevertheless describes the civil law's creation of law as
follows:
[The Civil Law's] centerpiece is the civil code, a vast
elaboration of legal concepts, definitions, institutions,
principles, and rules stated at a high level of generality
and purporting to cover the entire realm of private
relations: persons and the family, adoption, succession,
property rights, contractual obligations, agency, surety,
unlawful
harm-causing acts, labor, companies,
prescription of actions, evidence, creditor preferences, and
others. The goal of the civil code is to state in a general,
orderly, integrated, and complete way the rules of private
law needed to regulate private relations.49

48. Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Law for Productivity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
51, 57 (2002).
49.
Richard B. Cappalli, At the Point of Decision: The Common Law's Advantage Over the
Civil Law, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 87, 93-94 (1998).
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This elaborate process has been termed "legal science" by legal
commentators in the sense that rational thought has been employed by legal
scholars to create a logical legal structure, and deductive logic is then used
to deduce the law that should be applied to a particular set of factual
circumstances.o Cappalli further observes that:
The civilian codes, substantive and procedural, are
structured as magnificent exercises in logic, starting with
the most general purposes, propositions, and definitions,
and logically elaborating- their implications and
interactions in a network of increasingly detailed rules.
Once launched, the codes form the premises for case
solutions. Through logical reasoning, deductive and
analogic, the civilian lawyers and judges extract the
code's solutions to a myriad of human conflicts.5
The common law, unlike the civil law, is created in piecemeal fashion,
based on a line of cases, or conflicts, between parties. In the common law,
sense is made of these series of cases through a process of synthesis, an
analytically complex process by which facts of one case are distinguished
or analogized to those of other cases. This process is, however, not perfect,
and an argument can be made that any case can be differentiated from
another, depending upon the ultimate goal of the judge. One has only to
observe the number of closely split decisions by justices of the United
States Supreme Court to detect that the common law process of synthesis is
less than scientifically precise. Moreover, the almost perfect correlation
between the Justices' decisions, and their pre-existing ideological
inclinations, suggests that the inconsistencies in this less than perfect
process are not random, but rather quite deliberate. In contrast, in the civil
law, each decision is based on the facts before it, and must rise and fall on
the merits of the application of the law to the specific facts of the case
before the judges. That is not to say that civil law judges are always
impartial-far from it. Nevertheless, a civil law judge is not bound by
precedents that may require a certain result as a matter of law, but be
inequitable in a particular set of circumstances. This view of the civil law
is, of course, in tension with the common shibboleth that the civil law does
not permit discretion on the part of judges. In theory, a civil law judge
cannot exercise discretion since she is strictly bound by the positive law. In
practice, however, the absence of stare decisis gives her considerably more
latitude in how she applies the words of the fixed law to a particular set of
50.
51.

Id. at 94.
Id. at 89.
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facts. For example, in the United States Constitution, the words of the
equal protection clause have remained constant, but women were not
originally considered sufficiently "persons" under that clause to give them
the right to vote. Now, such a reading of the clause would be unthinkable.
This process of adapting to new realities and different contexts is facilitated
in the civil law.
The civil law not only benefited from a rich history of rational analysis
of legal problems, it responded rapidly to the Enlightenment's struggle
between the Church and more traditional rational approaches to law.
Charles Reid notes that in the twelfth Century, European continental law, or
civil law, responded rapidly to the developments of the Enlightenment by
developing a system of canon law. At the same time, the legal scholars and
rulers in Western Europe re-examined the Roman Law of Justinian.
Schools of law were established expressly for the teaching, and a "Digest
was reintroduced to a Western readership in the late eleventh century." 52
It should also be noted that there are aspects of the common law
system that can promote justice and fairness. For example, the use of juries
as independent fact-finders clearly helps avoid sole reliance on potentially
biased judges. The adversary system between lawyers engaged in
adversarial combat also arguably permits a greater exposition of every
possible fact of relevance. That the common law may have some, or even
many, features that promote justice better than a less-adversarial system
only supports the central thesis of this article that the development of the
particular American approach to dispute resolution is not simply a bizarre,
male approach to dispute resolution, but rather an approach that reflects a
very particular philosophical approach to dispute resolution in general.
Having discussed the historical basis for the unique approach of the
common law towards dispute resolution, it is helpful to take a comparative
approach to dispute resolution to avoid drawing sweeping conclusions from
a narrow comparison of the common and civil law systems.
2. Indigenous Methods of Dispute Resolution
Indigenous societies frequently employ forms of dispute resolution
that one might expect in relatively tight knit communities where social
harmony is a critical value. Although it is difficult to generalize about such
disparate societies, it is helpful to discuss some general aspects of dispute
resolution that are common, although certainly not universal, in indigenous
52.
Charles Reid, "Am I, by Law, the Lord of the World?" How the Juristic Response to
Frederick Barbarossa'sCuriosity Helped Shape Western Constitutionalism,92 MICH. L. REv. 1646,
1647 (1994); KENNETH PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW, 1200-1600:
RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1993).
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societies., Dispute resolution is usually focused on restoring harmony
among the members of the group, healing wounded pride and feelings. To
that end, the focus of the process tends to be on resolving the dispute so that
all members feel that justice has been served. Although there may be
"punishment," that is not the primary focus of the process: rather it may be
a means towards achieving a generally understood community based
concept of "justice." This contrasts with Western styles of adjudication,
where the focus is almost entirely on satisfaction of abstract notions of
Common to most of these
justice, with clear winners and losers.
indigenous methods of dispute resolution are formalized rituals to
solemnify the acts of apology, forgiveness, or retribution. The case studies
below of indigenous dispute resolution are but a very small snapshot of
indigenous systems of dispute resolution. These case studies are simply
intended to illustrate how other, male dominated societies that are neither
civil law nor common law based, have approached dispute resolution.
It also must be recognized that indigenous societies frequently have
unique social conditions that permit a less adversarial system of dispute
resolution than that found in the common law, or even civil law systems.
The close community, tight relationships among the parties, and relatively
homogenous values and religious beliefs are conditions that simply cannot
be replicated in larger societies.S4 Nevertheless, regardless of the means
employed to accomplish the particular goals of each indigenous system of
dispute resolution, these systems illustrate that male dominated societies
other than the civil law system have effectuated dispute resolution systems
that are radically at odds with the supposedly essentially male common law
dispute resolution system.
a. Case Study: The Navajo Justice System of DisputeResolution

The Code of Indian Offenses of 1938 and the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 set forth the structure of the Indian Courts.55 As a result of
forced migration and assimilation, few tribes had recollection of the
traditional dispute resolution processes. 6 Today, tribes make effort to

Indian Law into the Twenty-First Century:
53.
Carole E. Goldberg, Symposium:
OverextendedBorrowing: Tribal Peacemakingin Non-IndianDisputes, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1003, 100506 (1997).
54.
Id.
Gretchen Ulrich, CurrentPublic Law and Policy Issues: Widening the Circle: Adapting
55.
Traditional Indian Dispute Resolution Methods to Implement Alternative Dispute Resolution and
RestorativeJustice in Modern Communities, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 419, 432 (1999).
56. Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33
TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (Fall 1997).
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include "traditional tribal values, symbols, and customs into their
courtrooms and decisions."57
The Navajo Nation Peacemaker Court uses the adversarial system.
Nevertheless, the Navajo legal system is distinguished from the state model
of adjudication, in that, it is "horizontal" as opposed to "vertical."" A
vertical system relies on hierarchy, using rank and coercive power to
address conflicts. Parties have limited control over the process and a judge
or jury makes the final decision. In contrast, a horizontal legal system uses
a line to portray equality. The Navajo Nation uses the circle to analogize,
explaining that in a circle there is no right or left, nor is there a beginning or
end, and that every point-person--on a line of the circle looks to the same
center as the focus. Further, it conveys the image of people gathering
together for discussion. The Navajo Nation makes this alternative to
vertical justice work by favoring methods which use solidarity to restore
good relations among people and with one's self. It employs a system of
egalitarian relationships, replacing force and coercion with group solidarity,
having no ranks or status classifications. The process is referred to as
"peacemaking." 59
The use of the clan as a tool fosters deeply emotional feelings, which
create solidarity; this is referred to as k'e.60 "Navajo Justice uses k'e to
achieve restorative justice. When there is a dispute the procedure, which
[they] call 'talking things out,"' includes providing notice to every person
concerned or affected by the dispute to a gathering to discuss the matter.6 1
The gathering is in a relaxed atmosphere where every member of the
community affected by the case, even indirectly, "has the opportunity to be
heard." 6 2 The "zone of dispute" is wider than that of the vertical system, in
that, it includes not only the parties to the dispute but also relatives that the
problem affects.
The Navajo Justice system has no formal rules of
Free communication is encouraged until a
procedure or evidence.6
65
consensus is reached. "The process has been described as a ceremony."66

57.
58.
177 (1994).
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 2.
Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From It:" Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175,
Id. at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182-83.
Yazzie, supranote 58, at 183.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 184.
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Navajo tort law, an example of restorative justice, is based on the
theory of nalyeeh, a demand to be made whole by an injured party. The
injured party does not seek answers regarding intent, causation, fault, or
negligence.6 ' The underlying premise for nalyeeh is compensation for the
injured party so there are no bad feelings within the tribe.6 9 In addition, the
Navajo employ the concept of distributive justice to address the well being
of the community. 70 Distributive justice does not address fault or adequate
compensation; instead, distributive justice is concerned with the well being
of the community. The injured party's feelings and the defendant's ability
to pay are considered in the award of compensation.
The Navajo Peacemaker Court allows judges to refer cases to local
communities so that issues can be resolved in a free-form gathering instead
of taking the case to court.72 The Court uses a naat'aanii,a peacemaker,
who is selected by the community to act as a civil leader.73 The naat'aanii
is a guide who helps implement distributive justice by sharing knowledge
with the disputants in order to help them achieve consensus.74 Additionally,
the naat'aaniihas personal knowledge of the parties and dispute and is not
impartial or neutral like Western mediators.7 5 The desired outcome of the
process is to restore harmony between the parties and within the tribe.
b. Case Study: The Rotuman System ofDispute Resolution
The Rotumans are a minority ethnic group in the Republic of Fiji. The
Rotumans bear a closer cultural resemblance to other Polynesian ethnic
groups, such as the Samoans, than the other ethnic groups in Fiji. 6 In his
book, Dispute Management in Rotuma, Alan Howard notes that disputes
may be as heated as any in the United States. Nevertheless, they are
frequently prevented from escalating into violence through dispute
resolution techniques such as mediation by local chiefs and ritualized
apology. 77
Again, this indigenous dispute resolution system is aided by:

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
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Yazzie, supra note 58, at 184.
Id. at 185.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 186.
Yazzie, supranote 58, at 186.
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Id. at 186-87.
Ulrich, supra note 55, at 432.
Alan Howard, Dispute Management in Rotuma, 46 J. ANTHRO. RES. 263, 263 (1990).
Id.at271.
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1) a cultural belief system that teaches that vengeance
may be effected by ancestors if justice is not done in the
present;
2) a social conditioning to take into account the interests
of the larger community, as opposed to solely individual
interests; and
3) a belief that an apology is frequently more important
than restitution and/or retribution.
The Rotumans have five ritualized versions of the formal apology.79
When performed correctly, acceptance of the formal apology, faksoro, is
virtually mandatory, and is considered an honorable act.80 The Rotumans
are more typical than not of dispute resolution techniques in Polynesia and
Melanesia. Jim Dator, in his Report to the State Justice Institute,
documents the use of ADR techniques of dispute resolution in cultures such
as Polynesia, Micronesia, and Japan. In his Report, Dator notes, inter alia,
the importance of "apology," and the involvement of community figures in
resolving the dispute.
c. Case Study: The Minority Iban System ofDispute Resolution in the
Malaysian Sultanate of Brunei
While the government of Brunei implements the national ideology of
Melayu Islam Baeraja (MIB), which enforces Islamic principles, the Iban
tribe does not follow the dispute resolution methods set forth by the MIB.
Instead, religious law does not have any effect on the dispute resolution
process of the Iban. Historically, all members of the Than tribe lived
collectively in an elevated longhouse, a house built on high stilts. The high
construction of the house made it easier to defend the dwelling against
attack as ladders were drawn up and the house defended by all members of
the community.8 2 Today, the longhouse still survives as the communal
dwelling although it no longer serves the purpose of protection against the
enemy. Given that multiple families-sometimes up to twenty-five-share
one roof, it is imperative to preserve the peace among the members of the
community. The longhouse, therefore, serves as the site of dispute
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 268.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 274.
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resolution. Two sets of rituals guide the process: adat- customary system
of beliefs and practices that guide all behavior- and augury- rules for the
magic-religious requirements of the participants.8 3 A headman guides the
dispute resolution process, acting similarly to a mediator in Western dispute
resolution.84 The headman is the member of the longhouse who has the
etr
eitr
h
greatest knowledge of adat and augury. 85 Ulk
Unlike a western
mediator,
the
headman does not stay impartial and neutral. Instead, the headman knows
the parties in the dispute and their history in the community.
The
headman conducts a hearing in the longhouse in which all members of the
house can participate.
The hearing allows the community to openly
discuss the dispute and reach a settlement that would return harmony to the
longhouse.89 A settlement can include restitution, apology, or even
ritualistic practices such as spell-casting and performing ceremonies to
return good-fortune to the longhouse. 90 Further, the general principles of
adat and augury are followed in the resolution of a dispute between
members of different longhouses and members of the Iban with non-Iban. 9 '
d. China
In pre-revolutionary China, the cultural aspects of conflict resolution
are mainly dictated by Confucian values and ethics, such as harmony and
compromise. Li, rules of conduct governing relations between men and
patterns of behavior, are keyed to a person's status or social context.92 Fa
is enacted law designed to maintain order through the fear of punishment. 93
Mediation, an integral part of Chinese dispute resolution since the 17th
century, continues to fulfill the needs of several levels of society.9 4 In
addition to li and fa, there are several other principles that promote
mediation instead of adversarial conflict resolution. 95 Honor is very

83. Id. at 9.
84. Id. at I1.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 12.
87.
Black, supranote 82, at 12.
88. Id. at 14.
89. Id. at 13.
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92.
Carlos de Vera, ArbitratingHarmony: 'Med-Arb' and the Confluence ofCulture and Rule
of Law in the Resolution of InternationalCommercial Disputes in China, 18 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 150,
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important in the Chinese system of dispute resolution.9 6 Thus, in order to
maintain good relations, ganqing, the Chinese use mediation to preserve
guanxi, special relationships in which parties can make unlimited demands
of the other.9 7 Renqing, personal goodwill, and rang, willingness to
compromise, make the dispute resolution process flow more smoothly.98
Mediators are elected by the government or local committees. Chinese
mediators often educate the disputants, advising how they should think or
act and argue for concessions, and therefore, differ in their role from
Western mediators who are neutral and impartial.
e. Case Study: African Systems ofDispute Resolution
In Africa, there are numerous examples of indigenous, non-adversarial
forms of dispute resolution. Josiah Osamba, for example, has documented
examples of indigenous conflict resolution and reconciliation among
societies in Eastern Africa.9 9
In fact, Osamba argues that the
marginalization of indigenous conflict resolution practices is a significant
factor to violence in the pastoral regions.' 00 In East Africa, as elsewhere in
indigenous societies, dispute resolution traditionally involves the whole
society, solemn rituals, and agreements. The focus of dispute resolution is
on overall justice and respect for each other.
In South Africa, traditional indigenous courts mediate rather than
adjudicate. Tribal chiefs or headmen, who are frequently familiar with the
participants, often participate in the proceedings. The focus of the
proceedings is on restoring harmony and relationships, thereby preventing
disruption within and among the tribes. 0 '
In the context of Africa, Louise Vincent makes the argument that it is
inappropriate in the context of Africa to make an essentialist distinction
between men and women.102 She would therefore argue that it is a
96. Id.
97. Id. at 167.
98.
Vera, supra note 92, at 167.
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See generally Josiah Osamba, Peace Building and Transformation from Below:
Indigenous Approaches to Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation Among the PastoralSocieties In The
Borderlands Of Eastern Africa, 2 AFR. J. CONFLICT RESOL. (2001), available at
http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ajcr/ajcr_2001 1.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
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(last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
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questionable assumption that women possess essential qualities that make
them particularly effective peacemakers. 0 3 Engaging in such essentialist
categorization prevents them from obtaining advantages primarily available
to men and ignores the substantial differences among women. Moreover,
doing so forgets women who contribute directly or indirectly to violence.
On a practical level, many post-war reconstruction social programs
attempt to "empower" women to take active roles but actually focus solely
on these roles-attention to which is drawn by the same persons who
pigeon-hole in the first place-and focuses women on empowering
themselves in these limited capacities without consideration of issues which
are the actual bases of war and violence. Peace and roles of women are
marginalized by socially constructed gender stereotypes and unequal gender
relationships. The vulnerability of women in times of crises comes not
from their sensitive natures but from the constrictions placed on them by
social structures forcing them to be victims.' 44
IV. CONCLUSION

The Common Law approach to dispute resolution, with its focus on a
battle between the participants, is a result of the unique history of the
common law rather than male domination of the process per se. The
present system of dispute resolution employed in common law countries,
while containing certain attributes that are certainly functional with respect
to adjudicating disputes, is nevertheless based upon a long tradition
ultimately rooted in ritualized gladiatorial combat having little to do with
contemporary notions of justice. Understanding this history allows society
to change the debate over legal reform from an essentialist battle over
gender to a battle over functionality and a focus on the values that we, as a
society, wish to see implemented in our system of dispute resolution.
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